Selecting Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Selection in Asian Presidential Democracies

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Abstract

Following their countries' transition to democracy, presidents in Asia have commonly appointed members of opposition parties to their cabinets while facing challenges of consolidating democratic rule. Some presidents initially appointed a majority of partisan ministers but gradually replaced them with nonpartisans in the cabinet over time. Others maintained their cabinet composition, even after cabinet reshuffles, through the end of their terms. I explain this variation based on institutional and political contexts that shape the incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature. I argue that presidents have greater incentives to appoint nonpartisan cabinet members when institutional and political factors provide more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature; but they also take advantage of nonpartisan appointments when legislative parties find a cabinet seat costly. Presidents of new democracies face a range of challenges, including generating broad legislative support for necessary reform programs and recruiting policy experts reliable enough to put the president's programs above individual political agendas. Achieving these goals requires delicate balancing. Using a decision-theoretic approach, I develop a theory that the perceived value of a cabinet post traded with legislative support in a given institutional or political environment results in supply and demand incentives for providing and pursuing such political patronage. The components of these contexts, such as president's copartisan legislative support, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle, allow me to capitalize on variation both between countries and across the administrations within countries, in order to evaluate the key institutional and political determinants of cabinet formation from a comparative perspective. Using statistical analysis of original data compiled from the career and biographic information of more than 1200 cabinet members and in-depth interviews with a current vice president, a former prime minister, and current and former cabinet ministers, I demonstrate the prevalence of the following pattern across twenty years and twenty-one administrations in four major presidential systems in Asia: Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Popular presidents can easily induce legislative cooperation when their copartisan support is weak and enjoy exerting additional prerogatives when their coparitsan support is strong in the legislature. These findings show that strong support from the public as well as copartisans in the legislature allows presidents of new democracies to have more leeway in government formation, shifting the balance of power in presidential-legislative relations in favor of presidents.

1. Introduction: The Politics of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asia

In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), a retired general who became a presidential candidate of the Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD), won the Indonesian presidential election with vice presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla on his ticket. Kalla was a businessman with a strong political base in the largest party, the Golkar Party, in parliament. As a party chairman and a presidential candidate from the PD which was taking only ten percent of legislative seats in the Indonesian Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR), Yudhoyono's choice of Kalla was a strategic move to garner political support for his election and post-electoral governance. Once the Yudhoyono-Kalla government was formed, Golkar was soon realigned under the chairmanship of Kalla. With the Golkar chairmanship, Kalla was given the powerful task of hands-on cabinet formation, unusual for a vice president.[1] In 2009, when the PD became the largest party in the parliament after the April general election, Yudhoyono's choice of a vice presidential candidate for the upcoming presidential election was Boediono, a former central bank governor and university lecturer who had no strong independent political base.[2] With his party being largest in the DPR, Yudhoyono chose a politically weak figure as his vice president and started his second term with more leeway on his cabinet formation.

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian won the Taiwanese presidential election as a party leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a major opposition to the long-time dominant *Kuomintang*

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[1] Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013. The pre-electoral agreement on cabinet formation placed Yudhoyono in charge of the appointment of every post except economy-related ones. Once the Yudhoyono-Kalla government was formed, however, Kalla took an extensive role in the allocation of general posts.

[2] Indonesia's electoral laws require 25 percent of the votes in legislative elections or 20 percent of the seats in parliament for the president-vice president ticket to be eligible for presidential elections. In 2009, the PD won 26.4 percent of the seats in parliament and SBY need not seek a coalition from other parties. Sources: Horowitz (2013, p. 186); http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/17/the-key-to-understanding-indonesias-upcoming-elections-the-jokowi-effect/

(KMT). His election ended decades-long KMT dominance in the presidency but not in the legislature. When Chen took office in May 2000, his party held less than thirty percent of the seats in the Taiwanese legislature (*Li Fa Yuan*; Legislative Yuan). As one of several accommodative gestures to the majority party, Chen appointed multiple cabinet members from the KMT, including Tang Fei, who once was the Minister of National Defense under the KMT government, as first Premier. Chen's party won the largest share of seats in the legislature after the 2001 general election and Chen's cabinet appointments shifted away from the selection of opposition party members. The improved electoral performances of the president's party helped Chen to have more leverage over cabinet appointments (Wu, 2005). In presidential systems, the head of government and the legislature are separately elected to equal branches, and the former governs without serving at the pleasure of a majority of the latter. Paradoxically, chief executives in this system need to generate broad legislative support for reform programs as they do not necessarily control the legislature. Therefore, copartisans' gaining ground in the legislature allows presidents to exercise prerogatives in making cabinet appointments, less serving for legislative interest.

However, governance has not always proceeded this way. Suharto, Ferdinand Marcos, and Park Chung-hee - these are well-known presidents who led dictatorships in Asia. These regimes were based on restrictions on free and fair competition for legislative seats after the declaration of martial law and thus heavily imbalanced executive-legislative relations in their respective countries.[3] Under their personal rule, the president's party was simply an electoral vehicle for controlling the legislative branch whose *de facto* role was merely being a rubber stamp for the executive agenda. With legislative checks and balances mostly impeded, presidents

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[3] For example, in Indonesia only two opposition parties were allowed to compete against the president's party, and in Taiwan no opposition was allowed to form a party. In the Philippines and South Korea, the legislature was powerless during the martial law period.

could appoint loyal agents to the government who were administratively competent without strong political ambition.[4] The real political challenges for Asian presidents have come after democratization and a series of constitutional reforms that reinstated the legislature as a lawmaking institution representing the public will.

Presidents of new democracies face a variety of challenges. These include consolidating the institutions of democratic rule in order to make democracy "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 15). Not a few immature democracies gave way to military intervention or dictatorship when faced with political instability and social disorder. In the 1950's and 60's, a short history of "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia and parliamentary democracy in South Korea was followed by decades of military rule in these countries. At the same time, democratic transition may lead presidents to engage in tough political scenes such as divided government or assertive parliaments on a pathway of democratic development. As Dalton, Shin, and Chu (2008, p. vii) illustrate, presidents in Asian new democracies face institutional challenges from the opposition to bring down the government:

> In Indonesia, the National Assembly impeached President Abdurrahman Wahid and elected Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri as his successor. In South Korea, the National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hyun and suspended his executive powers. In Taiwan and the Philippines, the losers of presidential elections tried to bring down their democratically elected governments ...

While democratization gave rise to the president *of the people*, the institutions of democratic rule and political competition also legitimized legislators as significant challengers against the president pursuing his goals.[5] The president may have various reforms programs which now

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[4] Interview with the former Minister of Mining and Energy and the former Speaker of the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah; Regional Representative Council), Ginandjar Kartasasmita, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 13, 2013. During the Suharto's era, the nature of the authoritarian regime needed not accommodate the parliament and most cabinet members had professional background without strong party affiliation. See also Kartasasmita (2013).
[5] For simplicity and gender balance, I will refer to all presidents in the masculine (he) and all ministers in the feminine (she).

require broad legislative support to realize. On the other hand, he needs to recruit policy experts reliable enough to put his programs above individual political agendas.

In this dissertation, I examine how democratic institutions of governance affect public policy in developing Asia. There are three main questions that my dissertation will address:

1) How do presidents in new democracies employ government resources to accomplish their goals?

2) What are the implications of presidential cabinet appointments for economic policy making in new democracies?

3) How do administrative institutions shape presidential incentives to appoint certain types of cabinet members?

The rest of this chapter discusses the significance of cabinet formation in the literature of comparative presidential studies and introduces a research puzzle that has not previously been solved. The main body of the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems is based on the cases of Latin America. However, cabinet formation patterns in Asia reveal that they are substantively unlike those in Latin America. In Asia, presidential cabinets feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential term.

In Chapter 2, I introduce a comparative theory that takes into account institutional and political contexts including the president's copartisan share in the legislature and public opinion. Contrary to the conventional approach, I focus on the balance of power in presidential-legislative relations mainly based on the "internal" strength in the form of copartisan shares in the legislature and the "external" popularity from public support for presidents to explain cabinet formation patterns. My main argument is that presidents favor nonpartisan members (i.e., policy

experts without party affiliation) under increasing internal strength and external popularity, which give chief executives leverage vis-à-vis the legislature in making cabinet appointments. In Chapter 3, I empirically test a series of hypotheses derived from my theory, using originally collected data. With the proportion of nonpartisan members in presidential cabinets as a main dependent variable, a dataset records the monthly observation of cabinet formation from twenty-one administrations in four major presidential systems in Asia from their respective years of democratic transition through 2012: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). In Chapter 4, I address a "so what" question by examining the policy implications of cabinet formation in presidential systems. I focus on fiscal policy by looking into the impact of cabinet formation on the level of public spending and the fiscal balance of the government. In Chapter 5, I address an important subject in public administration: the quality of bureaucracy. The presence of nonpartisan ministers is prevalent in presidential cabinets and should not be neglected. In general, nonpartisan cabinet members include career bureaucrats, professors, and businessmen. I examine the relationship between the quality of bureaucracy and the appointment of such nonpartisan cabinet members to discuss how administrative institutions shape presidential incentives to appoint certain types of nonpartisan ministers.

1.1. Why Cabinet Formation in Presidential Systems?

1.1.1. Changing Agenda in Comparative Presidential Studies and Cabinet Appointments

In the 1980s and 90s, one of the main scholarly debates in political science was whether democratic regime type had a systematic impact on government and regime stability. Compared with parliamentary democracies, presidential systems seemed to have inherent problems of

undermining government and regime stability due to the constitutional design of the separation

of powers (e.g., Linz, 1990, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; Stepan & Skatch, 1993; Lijphart, 1994;

Valenzuela, 1994).[6] Since then, however, scholars have explicitly disputed and implicitly

disproved the general argument of presidentialism as an inferior regime[7] by manifesting a rich

variation within presidential systems in the diverse regional contexts. Rather than comparing

them with parliamentary systems, comparative presidential scholars focus on the variation across

presidential democracies. Among their findings: presidential systems are not all the same and

there is a variation in president's constitutional and partisan powers (Shugart & Carey, 1992;

Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a); the constitutional powers that are granted to popularly elected

presidents and their impact vary across semi-presidential countries in and outside Europe (e.g.,

Elgie, 1999; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Elgie & Moestrup, 2007, 2008; Schleiter & Morgan-

Jones, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Elgie, Moestrup, & Wu, 2011); the

formation of coalition governments is not rare in presidential systems; and the more fragmented

the legislature, the more actively presidents seek political cooperation with opposition parties to

form a coalition government (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007). The

institutional combination of presidential systems with multipartism once caused scholarly

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[6] According to Juan J. Linz (1990, 1994), the incentives of presidents and legislators shaped by the separation of powers make mutual cooperation difficult in presidential systems. First, presidents and legislators are elected in different constituencies, and their goals in office thus will be different. Second, executive governments in presidential systems are not held accountable to a legislative majority, and presidents in minority status may not actively seek legislative support to form a coalition government. Third, without an institutional mechanism of legislative confidence, political parties in presidential systems tend to be less disciplined than in parliamentary systems, and copartisan support for presidents therefore may not be reliable. Fourth, presidents and legislators are not dependent on each other for survival in office, and executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have a nature of mutual independence. Moreover, the governability problems can degenerate into the potential risks of regime instability for presidential democracies; due to weak incentives for mutual cooperation between presidents and legislators, executive governments in minority status are legislatively ineffective and may experience frequent gridlock in executive-legislative relations; and without institutional mechanisms such as no confidence votes to resolve the inter-branch deadlock, presidential democracies may lead to regime breakdown through extra-constitutional means of solution such as military intervention. This is a line of the "perils of presidentialism" logic.
[7] For example, Cheibub (2007) shows that it is not because of the regime type itself that makes presidential democracies more vulnerable to regime breakdown but because of the experience of military dictatorship before democratization that functions as a significant factor.

concerns about their governability and regime stability (Mainwaring, 1993). Today, scholars discuss the presidential strategic management of multiparty presidential systems (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012), suggesting that the Linzian view of "perils of presidentialism" could be somewhat over-generalized.

Given that presidents do actively seek legislative support from opposition parties, what executive resources are available to construct legislative support?[8] For example, Philippine presidents can take advantage of their control over the budgetary process in order to have legislative aids in the policy-making process (Bolongaita, Jr., 1995; de Dios, 1999; Kasuya, 2008). Presidents of Indonesia can use informal institutions such as consultation meetings with party leaders in the legislature to set the agenda and resolve inter-branch issues (Hanan, 2012, pp. 182-188). Among various executive tools granted, cabinet appointments form "a privileged site to study presidential strategies" as their choice in portfolio allocation is driven by their goals and constrained by the scarcity of cabinet posts and the saliency of the appointment process that draws considerable media and public attention (Amorim Neto, 1998, pp. 26-26):

> [T]he analysis of presidential policy-making strategies is a difficult exercise because they are hard to observe... Yet we can observe how presidents implement their strategies. In this sense, cabinet appointments constitute a privileged site to study presidential strategies. Every time presidents make a cabinet appointment they are signaling to the political system which interests they are willing to please, how they expect to exercise executive power, and how they plan to relate to the other branches of government...

As Table 1.1 shows, the different types of presidential cabinets in Latin America and Asia mean the formation of coalition governments is not rare in presidential systems. In Latin

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[8] Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power (2012) list five key tools, the so-called "presidential toolkit", used to build executive coalitions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet Union. The five tools include agenda power (legislative powers granted to the president such as decree authority), budgetary prerogatives (control of public spending), cabinet management (distribution of portfolios to alliance members), partisan powers (influence of the president over one or more coalition parties), and informal institutions (a diverse residual category reflecting country-specific historical and cultural factors).

America, three-fourths of cabinets are formed through such coalition building. In Asia, about 40

percent of executive governments consist of multiparty coalitions. In addition, presidents in

former communist countries and Africa are no exception about the flexible use of cabinet posts

to handle a multiparty legislature (e.g., Van de Walle, 2003; Whitmore, 2003; Chabal & Daloz,

2004; Remington, 2006; Bagashka, 2012; Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012).

Table 1.1: Number of Cabinets and Number of Types of Cabinets in Latin American and Asian Presidential Democracies

Country	N of Cabinets	n of Single-Party Majority Cabinets	n of Single-Party Minority Cabinets	n of Coalition Majority Cabinets	n of Coalition Minority Cabinets
Central and South America					
Argentina	6	1	3	0	2
Bolivia	8	0	1	4	3
Brazil	15	0	0	11	4
Chile	5	0	0	5	0
Columbia	11	0	1	10	0
Costa Rica	6	3	3	0	0
Ecuador	20	0	4	1	15
Mexico	2	2	0	0	0
Panama	7	0	0	3	4
Peru	9	2	1	4	2
Uruguay	6	0	0	6	0
Venezuela	6	1	3	1	1
Subtotal	101	9 (9%)	16 (16%)	45 (44%)	31 (31%)
Northeast and Southeast Asia					
Indonesia	6	0	0	6	0
Philippines	7	2	2	3	0
South Korea	7	3	3	0	1
Taiwan	6	4	2	0	0
Subtotal	26	9 (34.5%)	7 (27%)	9 (34.5%)	1 (4%)
Total	127	18 (14%)	23 (18%)	54 (43%)	32 (25%)

Sources: Amorim Neto (2006, p. 427) and East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.
Notes: The periods of countries may vary. For Latin America, see Amorim Neto (2006, p. 425). For Asia, the figures are from the following periods of four regimes: Indonesia (1999 to 2012), the Philippines (1987 to 2012), South Korea (1988 to 2012), and Taiwan (1993 to 2012). For Taiwan, four cabinets formed under the president-parliamentary system (after 1997) are also included.

1.1.2. Cabinet Formation Patterns and Unanswered Puzzle

The frequent formation of coalition governments in presidential systems, however, does not necessarily denote an equivalent mechanism across all presidential democracies. Moreover, looking into the actual formation process of presidential cabinets may reveal a nuanced and clear variation within the regime. The literature on presidential cabinet formation provides two main points on this. First, scholars have focused on a president's legislative powers as a key factor to determine the composition of the cabinet (e.g., Amorim Neto, 1998, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). According to the constitutional power theory, cabinets under legislatively weak presidents should feature more partisan ministers as they need legislative support in the policy-making process; but cabinets under presidents with extensive lawmaking power will include more nonpartisan ministers because chief executives have weak incentives to build a strong relationship with legislators for policy making.

Second, as empirical evidence to support the theory of cabinet formation, scholars have mainly employed Latin American cases where changes in cabinet formation are driven by changes in the partisan configuration of the government. According to the literature (e.g., Lijphart, 1999, 2012; Amorim Neto, 2002, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012), a new cabinet starts whenever one of the following conditions is met: 1) the inauguration of a newly elected or a re-elected president, or 2) any change in the partisan configuration of the government.[9] For example, in Brazil, the Franco administration started with

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[9] We may need the third criterion for the cases that a president is dismissed from office and a vice president or a prime minister formally inherits the presidency, because a president deceased or was impeached. However, this is rare. In East Asia, there has been only one case in the Philippines where Vice President Arroyo succeeded to the presidency in 2001 when President Estrada stepped down through a successful impeachment. Another criterion - "a

seven parties (PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PTB-PDT-PT-PSB) joining the government in October 1992

and ended with four parties (PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PP) represented in the government in December

1994 (Amorim Neto, 1998, p. 94). Between the two cabinets, there were three more cabinets

formed and dismissed due to changes in the party membership of the government. During the

period between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s, about 55 percent of new cabinets in Latin

America were formed due to these party membership changes in the government and the rest by

presidential elections (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 74-75).

Since democratic transition, presidents in Asia also have appointed members of the

opposition parties to their cabinets. For example, Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia

and Corazon Aquino, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines composed their

cabinets, particularly at the outset of their terms, with more partisan ministers, facing political

challenges (e.g., Timberman, 1991, pp. 169-174; Slater, 2004, pp. 72-74).[10] Some of these

presidents filled a majority of their cabinet posts with partisan ministers at the beginning but

gradually replaced them with nonpartisan members during their terms, while others maintained

the same cabinet composition, even after several cabinet reshuffles, from the beginning to the

end of their terms. Yet, there are major differences of cabinet formation patterns in Asia

compared with those in Latin America.

In Figure 1.1, the short and long vertical lines denote the proportions of reshuffling in the

cabinet in any given month; and the horizontal dotted line means the shares of nonpartisan

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change of more than 50 percent in the identity of individual ministers" - might lead to over-counting a number of
new cabinets (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2002, p. 55).

[10] For the cases of Estrada and Arroyo, interview with the Director-General of the Liberal Party and former
Undersecretary of Education, Jose Luis Gascon, in Manila, the Philippines, May 4, 2013. The dynamics of cabinet
politics among these presidents were different though. In Indonesia, the cabinet appointments of Wahid were by and
large constrained by the executive's accountability to the legislature. In the Philippines, the cabinet appointments of
Aquino were to a large extent driven by the need to fill a political vacuum in lawmaking institutions. The cabinet
appointments of Estrada and Arroyo were constrained by institutional threats as they faced serious threats to their
holding on to office with the impeachment initiative.

ministers in the cabinet observed in a monthly sequence. This figure illustrates two distinct features of cabinet formation in Asia: 1) frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and 2) the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. These changes seem more active in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines - particularly large-scale reshuffling in South Korea - than in Indonesia, but the latter has also experienced some changes in ministerial portfolios and the share of nonpartisan ministers during the presidential terms.


Figure 1.1: Percentage of Nonpartisan Ministers and Percentage of Cabinet Reshuffling in Asian Presidential Cabinets

Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.
Note: The percentages of nonpartisan ministers and cabinet reshuffling are month-by-month variations.

Moreover, while presidential cabinets feature these changes in ministerial portfolios and cabinet composition, changes in the partisan configuration of the government are relatively rare

during the fixed terms. Thus far, there have been only three cases of party membership changes in the government during the presidential terms in Asia. In 2001, President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea lost a partner of his coalition government, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) by its defection. In 2000 and 2005, the Liberal Party (LP) of the Philippines withdrew as a coalition partner from the Estrada government and the Arroyo government, respectively. In sum, presidential cabinets feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential terms.

Theoretically, these patterns of cabinet formation in Asia call into question the application of the conventional approach to Asian presidential systems. According to the constitutional power theory, cabinets under legislatively powerful presidents feature more nonpartisan ministers. Then we should see relatively consistent patterns of nonpartisan appointments within one presidential system or administration, because constitutional powers tend to be constant within a country and their reform is also rare. Since democratic transition in major presidential systems in Asia, there has been only one instance, in Taiwan, of any of these countries experiencing a constitutional reform. The patterns of cabinet formation illustrated in Figure 1.1, however, show that the proportions of nonpartisan ministers vary within one presidential system or administration, as well as from one to the next. For example, Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) and Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) of South Korea filled a majority of cabinet posts with partisan ministers at the beginning of the terms but gradually replaced them with nonpartisan members over time during their terms. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia formed his cabinets with clearly different configurations in the first term (2004-2009) and the second term (2009-2014) without any constitutional reform during this period.

Another puzzle is why presidents seem to overhaul their cabinets with frequent changes in ministerial portfolios as well as cabinet composition but try to keep the same partisan configuration of the government. Presidents may want to dismiss cabinet ministers who are incompetent, disloyal to their agendas, or involved in a scandal. However, replacing is not an easy and simple task as it usually takes a substantive amount of time and can be a lengthy process since it requires thorough screening, profile reviews, and multi-level approval. Moreover, frequent substitutions will deplete a pool of talented personnel (e.g., Dewan & Myatt, 2010). These puzzles are beyond existing explanations in the literature on presidential cabinet formation.

1.1.3. A Comparative Approach

In this dissertation, I will attempt to explain why some presidents have frequently changed their cabinet formation during the terms, while others have maintained relatively the same composition, even after several cabinet reshuffles, from the outset to the end of their terms, as well as how presidential cabinet formation affects economic policy making. I will use a comparative approach that examines not only the variation in cabinet formation between countries, but also between the administrations in those countries, focusing in particular on institutional and political contexts.

The four major presidential systems in Asia - Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan - face the same structural issues which for the most part are embedded in presidential systems. Presidents and legislators are independently elected to equal branches of government, with neither having direct control over who holds which office. Presidents may have a variety of reform programs which, nonetheless, will be vetoed if they fail to induce broad legislative support for them. Moreover, chief executives govern with a mandate of the people. When they

are strongly supported by the public, they can have para-constitutional prerogatives to go over

the heads of legislators by directly appealing to voters. On the contrary, prevalent public

grievances and mass protests may become a backdrop to legislative impeachment against

presidents, which may force chief executives to leave office. This is no less plausible in the

context of new democracies, where political parties have failed to function as an effective

mechanism of representing public interest and party systems of electoral competition are

characterized as clientelistic.

At the same time, the four countries show some variation in the following aspects of

institutional context and development, which should be reflected in presidential-legislative and

presidential-bureaucratic relations. First, legislative arrangements in Indonesia and the

Philippines are more fragmented than those in South Korea and Taiwan. Second, political parties

feature higher fluidity in the Philippines and South Korea than those in Taiwan and Indonesia.

Third, South Korea and Taiwan are equipped with more professionalized civil service systems

than the Philippines and Indonesia, where bureaucracy is politically more permeable.[11] These

common and distinct features rooted in the four presidential systems will allow me to explain not

only the variation in cabinet formation between countries, but also between the administrations

in these countries.

Models of presidential cabinet formation often suggest that there should be a higher

incidence of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet when presidents are granted more constitutional

power (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones,

2009b, 2010; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). Yet, if cabinet formation was related only to

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[11] In addition, some kinds of informal institutions in executive-legislative relations are more actively functioning in the Philippines and Indonesia than in South Korea and Taiwan. Informal institutions can be effective in some young democracies, and they seem to be accommodating or complementing rather than subverting or substituting in the operation of formal institutions in the former countries (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, pp. 13-19).

presidential constitutional powers, then we would expect to see such shares of nonpartisans in presidential cabinets be relatively stable within all presidential democracies. The fact that the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet varies within one presidential system or administration suggests that there should be conditions of different nature, which co-vary with this cabinet formation pattern. If we want to understand the dynamics of cabinet politics, it is necessary to seek out potential explanations for why the real, or perceived, value of a cabinet post in a given institutional, political, economic, social, or cultural context results in supply and demand incentives, of varying degrees, for providing and pursuing such political patronage. Therefore, I will propose a comparative theory that takes into account both institutional and political contexts that shape incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature, in order to explain such cabinet formation pattern.

I contend that presidents are more likely to appoint nonpartisan cabinet members in the context featuring increasing copartisan shares in the legislature, more fragmented legislative configuration, strong public support for presidents, and the outset of the presidential term, granted more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature. The president's legislative contingent (i.e., the copartisan share in the legislature) will produce basic supply conditions for a particular cabinet formation process, and the incentives of the parties in the legislature will form demand-side conditions in such process. Yet appointment decisions are not made in a vacuum; the political context may not directly influence the appointment decisions but will generate additional conditions for the real, or perceived, value of a cabinet post. These components of institutional and political contexts - the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle - will allow me to leverage variation both between

countries and across the administrations within countries, in order to evaluate the key institutional and political determinants of cabinet formation from a comparative perspective.

I will test my theory of cabinet formation using original cabinet-level data from twenty-one administrations of four Asian democracies that vary in terms of these institutional and political contexts within one presidential system and one administration. Time-series cross-section analysis will provide a comparative look at presidential cabinets across administrations within one presidential system as well as across these four cases. In addition, my analysis will make use of original minister-level data from the same four cases in Asia to assess whether differences in the quality of bureaucracy and presidential-bureaucratic relations have any effect on the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet who have extensive experience in civil service in their career.

Recently, there have been a growing number of comparative studies of political institutions comparing Asian democracies as an attempt to consolidate case-specific or context-oriented research into theme-oriented research in order to facilitate comparative analysis across and outside the region (e.g., Hicken & Kasuya, 2003; Rüland, Jürgenmeyer, Nelson, & Ziegenhain, 2005; Reilly, 2006; Dalton, Shin, & Chu, 2008; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011; Kasuya, 2013a). Yet, no study to date has attempted to systematically analyze cabinet formation patterns in the region. Nor has any study sufficiently considered the potential causal contribution of those components of institutional and political contexts - the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle - to the formation of the government in presidential systems. Therefore, this dissertation will be the first comparative study to systematically compare Asian democracies with a new theoretical approach.

1.2. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation will proceed in the following way. In Chapter 2, I introduce the theoretical motivation behind my argument and the relevant literature on which it builds. I first discuss presidential goals and trade-offs underlying in the cabinet formation process. Presidents want to both generate broad legislative support for necessary reform programs and deliver their policy commitments as planned through cabinet appointments, but they find that political clout and administrative loyalty often become a trade-off in the cabinet formation process. Then I introduce a theory of cabinet formation in presidential democracies. I argue that the institutional and political contexts, particularly the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle contribute to variation in cabinet formation in a given presidential system. These variables will affect the supply and demand incentives in the cabinet appointment process, and result in varying proportions of partisan or nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets. There will be a higher incidence of nonpartisan appointments in the cabinet when presidents are backed by more copartisans in the legislature, face more fragmented legislatures, are strongly supported by the public, and are beginning their terms. Under such conditions, presidents are granted more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature, and the perceived value of legislative support to trade with cabinet posts declines, resulting in weaker incentives to appoint partisan ministers from opposition parties.

The theory of cabinet formation is empirically tested with original cabinet-level data in Chapter 3, where I introduce four cases of major presidential systems in Asia - Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan - and describe the patterns in cabinet formation over two decades and across administrations. The selection of cases is based on the commonalities of political history, regional proximity, and institutional structure and the distinct features of

institutional context and development. Time-series cross-section analysis will provide a comparative look at how cabinet formation differs at the administration and system levels across democracies of varying conditions of institutional and political contexts and assess the effect of these conditions on the practice of cabinet politics in Asia. In addition, interviews with nearly 40 cabinet members including a current prime minister, a former vice president, and current and former cabinet ministers provide case- or context-specific evidence explaining my statistical findings.

In Chapter 4, I examine the policy implications of cabinet formation by examining the impact of cabinet composition on the level of public spending and the fiscal balance of the government. Cabinet formation and ministerial stability show important features of the government but have been relatively neglected in the literature. I consider these variables as the key determinants of fiscal behavior in Asian presidential systems. I argue that the less partisan influence and the lower ministerial turnover in presidential cabinets, the less public spending and positive fiscal balances. This argument is empirically explored with original data from 21 administrations of the same cases of four Asian democracies.

In Chapter 5, I examine the association between the appointment of certain types of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet and presidential-bureaucratic relations. Nonpartisan ministers are prevalent in presidential cabinets and they generally include career bureaucrats, professors, and businessmen. I argue that the quality of bureaucracy shapes presidential incentives to appoint different types of nonpartisan ministers to the cabinet. In professional civil service systems, presidents may have delegation problems due to a closed nature of the system but enjoy a sizable pool of talented personnel supplied from bureaucracy; however, in politicized civil service systems, presidents may easily control executive agencies more directly but face a

limited pool of qualified personnel within bureaucracy. My argument is empirically tested with original minister-level data including information about over 1200 cabinet ministers from the same cases of four presidential democracies in Asia. A considerable number of nonpartisan cabinet members from South Korea and Taiwan have career records of several years' experience in their professionalized civil service systems, but in Indonesia and the Philippines, where civil service systems are politically more permeable, a majority of nonpartisan ministers have backgrounds in business or academia without any experience in bureaucracy. In Chapter 6, I conclude with a summary of my dissertation.

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2. A Theory of Presidential Cabinet Formation in New Democracies

What explains the variation in cabinet composition in Asian presidential systems? As examined in Chapter 1, presidential cabinets in Asia feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential term. Then, why is the existence of nonpartisan ministers more prevalent in some countries and some administrations in certain periods of time than in others? In this chapter, I introduce a theory of cabinet formation in new democracies that takes into account differences in institutional and political contexts between countries and administrations. Before presenting this theory, I first address presidential goals in office and trade-offs in the cabinet formation process that shape presidents' incentives to form different types of cabinets, enabling us to better understand the observed patterns of cabinet formation in Asian presidential systems.

2.1. Presidential Goals and Cabinet Appointments

Presidents of new democracies face a range of challenges and often address them with executive resources such as cabinet appointments (e.g., Geddes, 1994; Amorim Neto, 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012; Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). On one hand, these challenges include generating broad legislative support for necessary reform programs for the purpose of consolidating the institutions of democratic rule or simply for their political survival in the situations where there is a high level of political uncertainty or regime instability. With diverse issues threatening regime stability - from great difficulty of putting military forces under civilian control to frequent violence from regional insurgencies - presidents will be pressured to compose

their cabinets with representatives from a variety of political persuasions and at least may attempt to secure a clear majority of legislative support for their leadership. In other cases, presidents who have a strong desire to retain office will be motivated to seek out legislative support with their political patronage when they encounter institutional threats such as impeachment. Legislative endorsement to presidents may not always secure a peaceful fixed-term career in office, but presidents with strong legislative support are less likely to be impeached successfully (e.g., Kada, 2002, 2003; Kasuya, 2003, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Therefore, presidents occasionally award executive cabinet posts in return for their individual survival when facing such threats.

On another hand, presidents need to recruit policy experts who are reliable enough to put the president's programs above individual political agendas. In other words, chief executives need executive agents that are administrative efficient and politically loyal. In presidential democracies, an executive's ability to keep his promises to the public is important in the eyes of the voters, and the presidential capacity to accomplish their policy agendas tends to be "a necessary condition for a successful presidency" (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b, p. 399). Therefore, a presidential cabinet should be reflecting "the president's calculations regarding policy and political challenges he might face" (2005, p. 7).

These goals might not exhaust important political objectives that presidents are supposed to embrace in their cabinets,[1] but in this dissertation, I contend as presidents' key objectives that chief executives generally want to have their government and necessary reform programs

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[1] Among others, one of the most typically and widely sought political objectives is representation in the government. For example, the Indonesian decision-makers tend to pursue harmony in the cabinet by appointing cabinet members from diverse political, regional, religious, and ethnic backgrounds (Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013).

broadly supported by the legislature and their agendas well implemented in the executive through cabinet appointments.

2.2. Trade-off in Cabinet Appointments

Presidents, pursuing these goals as a single national leader, have dual objectives in cabinet formation: garnering adequate legislative support and delivering their programs as planned. For this reason, presidents will appoint to their cabinets representatives with both political clout and administrative loyalty, but these characteristics often become a trade-off in the cabinet formation process. Amorim Neto (1998, pp. 11-12) discusses a presidential dilemma in cabinet formation to achieve their goals:

> Allocation of cabinet posts is a chief resource available to presidents in the accomplishment of the presidential goals. [T]o pass legislation, presidents may make necessary the appointment of some party politicians to the cabinet. [T]o efficiently control the executive branch from above, presidents have to look for individuals personally loyal to them. Yet there may be tradeoffs between these goals. On the one hand, party politicians appointed to the cabinet often have their own agendas, which may collide with that of the president. On the other, should a president appoint mostly trustworthy people to the cabinet, he or she may deplete the latter of the political capital necessary to successfully deal with the legislature. This is a dilemma faced by all presidents when it comes to forming the cabinet.

The studies of party organization and behavior suggest that chief executives in presidential systems engage in different incentive mechanisms than those in parliamentary systems in terms of appointing partisan ministers (e.g., Samuels, 2002; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Based on the principal-agent approach, these studies argue that the differences in the constitutional design shape the distinct natures of the relationship between legislators and chief executives, which affect the chief executives' incentives to appoint partisan ministers to their cabinets. In parliamentary systems where a single chain of delegation links the voters' choice of

parliamentary members to government formation by majority leaders of the parliament, political parties play a central role as an efficient vehicle for screening and selecting cabinet ministers as well as parliamentary candidates (Müller, 2000). As Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010, p. 1425) point out, the incentive of appointing partisan ministers to the cabinet is compatible with the legislators' aim, because in parliamentary systems "party affiliation ensures that ministers share with the legislators who empowered them the aim of serving the party's electorate and delivering the party's policy commitments as well as the fear of electoral accountability, which may cost their party its ministerial and legislative seats." In presidential systems where chief executives and legislators are separately elected by different constituencies, however, appointing partisan ministers to presidential cabinets may lead to a political tension with chief executives due to mutually incompatible incentives.

According to Samuels and Shugart (2010), the institutional features of separate origin and separate survival paint presidential democracies with a tension between presidents and partisans. Under the separation of origin where presidents and legislators are elected in mutually independent constituencies, they consequently have incongruent voter concerns and campaign strategies. Presidents or presidential candidates whose electorate is a single national district may try to appeal to broader voter groups even at the expense of the importance of their party ideology and party organization (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 171). Hence, different electoral incentives mean inherent tensions between the two.

Once presidents are in office, the mutual tensions are more likely to be intense rather than moderate. Under the separation of survival where the president has a fixed-term tenure, the chief executive is held accountable neither to his own party nor to the legislature. Given their personal legitimacy and relative autonomy as well as without such a threat as the parliamentary no-

confidence motion, presidents will serve as *de facto* party leaders in the governing arena regardless of formal party leadership (Samuels, 2002, p. 469; Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 201). Since presidents cannot enjoy the same high level of incentive compatibility through partisan appointments as chief executives in parliamentary systems, even partisan presidents often combine party members with loyal nonpartisans in their cabinets (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010, p. 1425).

In the context of Asian presidential systems, the institutionally structured strain between presidents and partisans is implicitly and explicitly observed. With Indonesia's fragmented legislature, presidents of Indonesia have strong incentives to form a multiparty coalition government but are still likely to limit the number of partisan ministers in order to recruit policy experts who are qualified for technical ministries.[2] In the Philippines, where individual members and leaders of political parties tend to put their personal ambition ahead of their party's policy agenda (Kasuya, 2008, p. 110), presidents will find more than a certain number of partisan ministers unnecessary for effective governing in normal circumstances. In Taiwan and South Korea, we can more clearly see the presidential governing strategies at the cost of the importance of their party position. In 2000 when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan won the presidential election, President-elect Chen Shui-bian faced a legislature dominated by the opposition *Kuomintang* (KMT). As an accommodative gesture for the national mandate, Chen appointed Tang Fei, the former Minister of National Defense under the KMT government, as first Premier of the DPP government. Although it was a strategic move that seemed necessary for Chen's effective governing under divided government, his keeping the DPP out of the decision

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[2] Interview with former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013.

loop upset and frustrated a number of his party members.[3] In 2005, President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea reached out to the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which held the second-largest number of seats in the legislature, accounting for slightly over 40 percent. Seeing his party slipping away from a legislative majority due to its violation of election laws, Roh formally proposed the formation of a grand coalition to the GNP. However, Roh's choice to not discuss this statement initially with his party members put them in the position of convening a posterior national executive committee to form an interparty consensus.[4]

2.3. Literature Review

Presidents have a fixed-term tenure to accomplish their goals, yet they encounter the dual-executive dilemma in their cabinet appointments. How does the chief executive balance the cabinet to accomplish his goals? What explains the variation of cabinet composition in presidential systems? Why is the existence of nonpartisan ministers more prevalent in some countries and some administrations in certain periods of time than in others?

Much of the existing literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems has focused on the presidential constitutional powers of policy making by linking their policy-making strategies to the incentives to form different types of cabinets (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). These studies commonly claim that there is a higher incidence of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet when presidents are granted more powerful authorities. For example, Amorim Neto (2006) argues that in presidential systems, chief executives whose proposals pass through the regular

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[3] Interview with Deputy Director of the DPP International Affairs Department, Hsieh Huai-hui, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 8, 2013.
[4] Yonhap News, "Reactions from Political Parties" (in Korean),
http://search.ytn.co.kr/ytn/view.php?s_mcd=0101&key=200507291558008365&q=%EC%97%AC%EC%95%BC%2C+%EB%8C%80%EC%97%B0%EC%A0%95+%EB%B0%98%EC%9D%91 (accessed March 29, 2014).

statutory process have strong incentives to appoint more partisan ministers than those who can use executive prerogatives such as decree powers to enact bills, because they need legislative support in the statutory process and thus seek to build a strong relationship with legislative parties. Chief executives who can obtain their policy-making goals in a more unilateral way have no such incentives to appoint partisan ministers in their cabinets. Similarly, Cheibub (2007, p. 62) argues that presidents have weak incentives to seek legislative support if they are granted strong policy-making powers (i.e., a monopoly on important legislative initiatives or veto power), making coalition governments less likely in the circumstances.

In semi-presidential systems where both presidents and legislatures have a say over cabinet appointments, the president's greater influence over cabinet formation tends to lead to a higher proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Almeida & Cho, 2007; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010). Introducing a model of cabinet selection in semi-presidential systems that is described as a "tug-of-war" between a prime minister and a president, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) find that the existence of a legislatively powerful president as well as of a popularly elected president is positively correlated with a share of nonpartisan ministers in semi-presidential cabinets. Proposing a principal-agent account of semi-presidential governments where a president and parliamentary parties are main actors that influence the formation process, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009b, 2010) argue that presidential influence on government formation increases with presidential constitutional power, which is empirically supported by a rise in the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. In addition, a formal model presented by Almeida and Cho (2007) draws equilibrium cabinets where the stronger the president's power to nominate the prime minister, the higher the share of nonpartisan ministers in semi-presidential governments.

Thus, the share of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets can be viewed as an indicator of presidential leverage over cabinet appointments vis-à-vis the legislature. As Martinez-Gallardo (2005, p.101) points out, a presidential cabinet will reflect "a bargaining equilibrium - a (sometimes explicit) bargain between the president and the parties in the legislature that will, on the one hand, provide the president with the political support necessary for effective policymaking, as well as allowing him to incorporate the expertise that will provide the government with policy credibility and capacity." If the president is powerful enough not to bargain with the parties in the legislature for their support, a high proportion of nonpartisan ministers is more likely in his cabinets. Therefore, "the participation of a president with substantial powers in the government formation process increases the likelihood that nonpartisans will be appointed to the cabinet" (Almeida & Cho, 2007, p. 5).

However, these studies have problems too. Existing studies of presidential cabinet formation have separated presidential policy-making strategies based on whether presidents are granted executive prerogatives or not. Executive prerogatives such as presidential decrees can be powerful policy-making tools as these constitutional practices allow the chief executive to act unilaterally vis-à-vis the legislature. However, they could be costly and are often seen as only to be used for exceptional cases or specific purposes, because going over the heads of legislators touches on a legitimacy component (Amorim Neto, 2006, pp. 416-420). In response to these provisional measures, the legislature generally has its own ways to amend them or regulate the use of them (Mainwaring, 1997, p. 107). Therefore, although such prerogatives could technically be useful instruments for the chief executive, their actual use may not be as simple and perennial within presidential administrations.

More importantly, the argument based on presidential constitutional powers does not much help to explain the prevailing appointment patterns in Asian presidential systems, where cabinet composition varies within one presidential system or administration, or from one to the next. In democratic political systems, constitutional powers tend to be constant within a country and their reform is also rare. As seen in Table 2.1, since democratic transition in major presidential systems in Asia, there has been only one instance, in Taiwan, of any of these countries experiencing a constitutional reform.

A surficial view of Table 2.1 seems to reveal distinct features of presidential constitutional powers across four presidential systems in East Asia. Presidents of South Korea and the Philippines are granted more power in total, while presidents of Indonesia are constitutionally least powerful. However, a deliberate view of the table may give two notable commonalities among these cases, which further undermine the applicability of the conventional approach to Asian presidential systems. First, presidents in these countries have sufficient discretion to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers so that cabinet appointments are perceived to be executive prerogatives.[5] In Taiwan, where semi-presidential institutions were adopted after the 1997 constitutional amendment, the legislature (Legislative Yuan) has a no confidence vote against the premier and the executive branch (Executive Yuan), but the president may dissolve the legislature once such a vote has been cast (Hicken & Kasuya, 2003, p. 126). Thus, the Taiwanese president has a powerful institutional weapon to defend against any legislative

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[5] In the Philippines, according to the 1987 Constitution, presidential appointment of cabinet ministers requires confirmation by the congressional *Commission on Appointments* which is composed of 12 Senators, 12 House members, and the Senate President. However, a good number of ministerial appointees have occupied cabinet positions without a final confirmation by the Commission and sometimes presidents do not bother to follow the formal appointment process (Interview with the former Secretary of Education, Edilberto de Jesus, in Manila, the Philippines, April 26, 2013).

attempt to dismiss the cabinet.[6] Second, presidents in all four systems have some policy-making

powers that are far from weak. Presidents of South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia are granted

powers to issue decrees. Philippine presidents, with their power of the purse, can have their

policy programs proposed and enacted in the legislature even without any direct policy-making

power (Bolongaita, Jr., 1995; de Dios, 1999; Kasuya, 2008). Moreover, except in post-1997

Taiwan, these powers have not changed since the democratization of these respective countries.

Therefore, at the system level, the formal powers have been static, which do not seem to explain

well the prevailing variation patterns in Asian presidential cabinets.

Table 2.1: Constitutional Powers of Popularly Elected Presidents by Country in East Asia

	South Korea	Taiwan (before 97)	Taiwan (after 97)	Philippines	Indonesia
Legislative Powers					
Package Veto	2	2	0	2	0
Partial Veto	0	0	0	3	0
Decree	2	1	1	0	1
Exclusive Introduction of Legislation	0	0	0	0	0
Budgetary Powers	3	3	3	3	0
Proposal of Referenda	4	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	11	6	4	8	1
Non-legislative Powers					
Cabinet Formation	3.5*	3.5*	4	3	4
Cabinet Dismissal	4	4	4	4	4
Censure	3**	4	2	4	0
Dissolution of Assembly	0	0	1	0	0
Subtotal	10.5	11.5	11	11	8
Total	21.5	17.5	15	19	9

[6] Thus far, the institutional weapon to defend the executive branch has been powerful enough to deter legislators from actually attempting to dismiss a cabinet at the cost of their jobs. The similarity in the operation of the Taiwanese system to other Asian presidential democracies makes it comparable with the three other cases in Asia despite its constitutional feature of semi-presidentialism (Personal Conversation with Dr. Yu-Shan Wu at Academia Sinica, October 21, 2013).

The changing patterns of cabinet appointments in Asian presidential systems also make us suspect that the actual influence of presidents may not be the same within one presidential system or administration. In established democracies, it is not unusual to observe the actual power of presidents disagreeing with their formally granted powers (e.g., Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006), and this tendency is more likely in young democracies where the institutions of democratic rule are in the consolidating process. The fact that the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets varies within one presidential system or administration suggests that there should be conditions of different nature other than constitutional powers, which co-vary with such cabinet formation pattern. If we want to understand the dynamics of cabinet politics, it is therefore necessary to seek out potential explanations for why the real, or perceived, value of a cabinet post in a given institutional, political, economic, social, or cultural context results in supply and demand incentives, of varying degrees, for providing and pursuing such political patronage. Thus I will propose a comparative theory that takes into account both institutional and political contexts that shape incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature, in order to explain such cabinet formation pattern. In the rest of this chapter, I present such a theory of presidential cabinet formation, building on general theories of presidential power and party behavior as well as other models of cabinet politics in presidential and semi-presidential systems that have been developed in the existing literature. I will argue that such cabinet formation patterns manifest changes in the

equilibrium cabinet due to varying degrees of players' incentives shaped by institutional and political contexts, which also vary during the presidential term. Specifically, presidents have greater incentives to appoint nonpartisan members in the cabinet when institutional contexts provide more leverage to the president vis-à-vis the legislature.

2.4. Theory

2.4.1. Institutional Factor I: President's Legislative Contingent

The president's legislative contingent may generate some basic conditions for a particular cabinet formation process due to the presidential incentives involving his policy goals. Presidents tend to trade off political support and policy expertise in the cabinet formation process to provide both stable legislative support and effective governance (Martinez-Gallardo, 2005, p. 103). The president's legislative contingent could be a rough measure of the strength of his legislative support base. Based on his party's strength in the legislature, the president is likely to face a different nature of executive-legislative relations and his strategies in the cabinet formation process are also likely to vary accordingly. When his party takes a firm control over the legislature, the president may get his agendas easily enacted (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 421), and his cabinet formation strategy is likely to focus more on finding individuals with policy expertise that will help to perform his programs. On the contrary, when his party is in a minority status, the chief executive is willing to take advantage of executive resources in exchange for more legislative support for him; thus his incentives to form a coalition government are stronger in this situation (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007).

Research on presidential powers lists two categories of presidential powers: constitutional and partisan (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a). Presidential partisan powers are defined as

"abilities to shape (or, conceivably, dominate) the lawmaking process that stem from the president's standing vis-à-vis the party system" (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997, p. 13). Although constitutional and partisan powers are two separate sets of powers from different sources, scholars of presidential studies have observed that the latter seems more essential for successful governing, as "presidential effectiveness is severely limited when executives face opposition partisan majorities in the legislature" (Carey, 1997, p. 203; Fiorina, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994). Even though they are granted strong constitutional powers, chief executives with a lack of sufficient legislative support may struggle to have their agendas enacted, as in the case of Brazil (Mainwaring, 1997). In contrast, considerable support from their party in the legislature helps presidents to get their policy programs passed without such executive prerogatives as decree powers, as in the case of Costa Rica (Carey, 1997). Therefore, the partisan strength of presidents, as they see it grow with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, should be an important factor to influence the strategies of presidential policy making and the incentives of their cabinet appointments.

Additionally, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b) note that there is a second component to presidential partisan powers: the coherence of the support presidents receive from their party. When the president's party is internally fragmented, his partisan powers will be attenuated even when his copartisans hold a legislative majority (Archer & Shugart, 1997, p. 110). Whether copartisan members can be disciplined along the party line during their leader's term in office (i.e., to provide consistent support for the chief executive) depends on other institutional mechanisms in the electoral process (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b)[7] or in the policy-making

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[7] The electoral mechanism is related to how much influence the party leadership exerts on the rank-and-file members' reelection. The three features that affect the degree of leaders' influence are: control of candidate selection and nomination; control of the order where members are elected from a party list; and pooling of votes among a party's candidates (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b, p. 421).

process (Cheibub, 2007).[8] In general, parties in presidential systems tend to show lower cohesion than those in parliamentary systems (Carey, 2009). Moreover, the separation of powers easily shapes the different agendas of interest and creates distinct incentives between the president and his party members, which may generate intraparty conflict. Nevertheless, individual members of the president's party are likely to stay in the governing party and support the president, because with little choice, they are better off doing so and getting even a little in return than withdrawing support and getting nothing (Samules & Shugart, 2010, p. 210). At any rate, presidents will serve as *de facto* party leaders in the governmental arena, regardless of formal party leadership (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Gaining the president's legislative contingent can be viewed as shifting presidential incentives for partisan to nonpartisan appointments. As their party becomes large enough to control the agenda in the legislature by taking a majority or even a plurality of seats, chief executives will gradually lose an incentive to seek legislative support, because they can enjoy more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature. In this process, there will be some copartisan appointments to presidential cabinets for electoral or partisan purposes,[9] but their share is not likely to be a majority in the cabinet.[10]

In Asian presidential systems, the importance of the president's legislative contingent as institutional leverage for the president vis-à-vis the legislature cannot be understated in the

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[8] The policy-making mechanism is related to who controls the legislative agenda between the executive and legislature. According to Cheibub (2007, pp. 125-132), the structure of the policy-making process affects the behavior of individual representatives in presidential democracies. If it is the legislature that makes proposals, the decision-making process tends to be decentralized, as in the U.S. system where individual legislators have more say on policy decisions. On the other hand, if the government can set the agenda, individual members of the party are often limited to amending government proposals.

[9] See Amorim Neto and Santos (2001) and Amorim Neto (2002) for the relationship between party discipline and cabinet formation.

[10] The East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set collected for this dissertation indicates that there has been only one instance when the proportion of copartisan ministers was over 50 percent in presidential cabinets since the four Asian presidential systems' democratization. The cabinet formed by President Roh Tae-woo of South Korea included 52 percent of ministers from his *Democratic Justice Party* for eight months between 1988 and 1989.

cabinet formation process (Kasuya, 2013b, p. 24). When chief executives are supported by

copartisan majorities in the legislature, typically through electoral gains, but also through

merging parties (e.g., Roh Tae-woo of South Korea) or party-switching by members of other

parties (e.g., Fidel Ramos and Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines), we commonly observe a

high incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members as prevalent patterns of ministerial appointment.

Even copartisans' taking pluralities in the legislature can help presidents to appoint more

nonpartisan ministers to their cabinets (e.g., Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan). On the contrary, presidents tend to

struggle in executive-legislative relations when they are faced with a lack of such legislative

support. In this case, we are likely to see more members of other legislative parties appointed to

presidential cabinets or similar gestures to do so from the chief executive (e.g., Kim Dae-jung

and Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea, Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia, Chen Shui-bian of

Taiwan, Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines).

Hypothesis 1: As the president's legislative contingent increases, there is a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members in presidential cabinets.

2.4.2. Institutional Factor II: Party System

An additional, possibly crucial, institutional factor that contributes to cabinet formation is

the party system that presidents face in executive-legislative relations. Although there are

multiple ways to define a party system, the most common way to clearly outline key

characteristics of a competitive party system in a democratic country is a classification by the

number of relevant parties and the degree of fragmentation in the legislature (Sartori, 1976).

Legislative fragmentation tends to be correlated with the president's legislative contingent

(Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 422), but has its own effects in the cabinet formation process due to the main component of the party system.

The main component of the party system involves the behavior of other legislative parties vis-à-vis the president (e.g., Altman, 2000; Samuels, 2002). In presidential systems, the behavior of political parties is largely driven by their chances of victory in the executive election, because the most important and largest electoral prize for political parties is the chief executive post. Although the separation of powers denotes separate origin and survival where executives and legislatures are elected in distinct constituencies and mutually independent in governing, the existence of direct elections for the executive branch affects the organization of political parties and their incentives in the governmental as well as electoral arenas. Political parties in presidential systems will aim primarily at winning the presidential election and concentrate their party resources and efforts on this particular election since it is the most important prize for them to target. However, not every party will contend for the executive election, particularly the smaller parties in situations of multiparty competition, and those who cannot compete in the executive election will rather support other major contending parties by coordinating with them to advocate a particular presidential candidate. Therefore, the strategies of a political party and its behavior depend to a large degree on the "subjective evaluation of its chances of winning the presidential election" (Samuels, 2002, p. 471).

When there are only two parties fielding presidential candidates, an intense rivalry emerges around the winner-take-all feature of competition in the executive election. Since one party's gain means the other's loss, political interaction and relationships often have the nature of a zero-sum game (Downs, 1957). In this type of party competition, the opposition party has weak incentives for political cooperation with the president, because it has the same objective which

leads to a conflict of strong vote-seeking incentives with the presidential party. As the number of parties competing in the party system increases, however, the nature of party competition is likely to change. Small parties that have a lower chance to win are likely to coordinate with large parties. With their strategy of not competing against but instead supporting a large party, small parties can increase the latter's electability and may have access to executive offices or policy concessions in exchange for their support, once their partner wins.

In multiparty systems, there is usually no dominant party taking control over the legislature, particularly when it is more fragmented and parties have room for strategic interaction to boost their political leverage (Strøm, 1990). The president whose party holds only a minority of seats is willing to offer cabinet posts or policy concessions to other parties for more stable legislative support. Small parties are also willing to support the president in return for obtaining benefits from office resources or policy influence.[11] Therefore, political parties tend to be cooperative with chief executives in multiparty systems, because their incentives are compatible with the chief executives' in the cabinet formation process. The more parties in the legislature, the greater the probability of a coalition government, because, with legislative fragmentation, parties are likely to shift their strategies from competing against to cooperating with chief executives.[12] In sum, legislative fragmentation in presidential systems induces strong

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[11] The literature tends to see the party's (short-term) office-seeking or policy-seeking goal as a trade-off with its (long-term) vote-seeking one (e.g., Strøm, 1990; Samuels, 2002). In the circumstances where these incentives are mutually compatible, however, one may not be necessarily at the cost of the other, because the party's strategies of pursuing short-term benefits can be instrumental to boost its votes in the upcoming election. In multiparty systems where small parties themselves cannot be influential as an opposition to the government, they are better off accessing office perks and using them in favor of their local constituencies so that they can claim the credit. Voters in turn will support their parties or politicians in the election, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the government, as long as they can deliver pork for them. This type of patron-client relationship is not unusual in Asia, particularly in the Southeast Asian region. Specifically, those parties seeking particularistic goods for their constituencies will easily hire out their support for the president in return for office benefits (Kellam, 2013).

[12] In addition, Altman (2000) finds that in a multiparty legislature, legislative parties that are ideologically closer to the president's party have a higher chance to join a coalition government.

incentives for political cooperation between the chief executive and the parties in the legislature, which will lead to a high likelihood of coalition formation (Cheibub, 2007).

Note that the impact of the party system may interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of the differences in the intensity of legislative competitiveness against presidents in different party system contexts as the president's legislative contingent increases. When his party holds only a minority of seats in the legislature, the president has strong incentives to seek legislative support with the strategic use of executive resources. In multiparty systems, where legislative parties tend to be cooperative with the chief executive in exchange for their access to government resources, the mutually compatible incentives will be conducive to coalition formation. In two-party systems where the opposition party has strong incentives to compete against the president, however, the chief executive is likely to engage in hostile relations with the legislature. Often, what is observed in this situation is the choice of more nonpartisan ministers to neutralize the cabinet as a mutually acceptable entity (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 627; Almeida & Cho, 2007, p. 5).

With the presidential party's gaining seats in the legislature, the president will enjoy more clout in the cabinet formation process. The chief executive's incentives to pursue legislative support become weaker as his party takes a majority (in two-party systems) or a plurality of seats (in multiparty systems) in the legislature. Presidents have considerable institutional leverage when copartisans hold the most seats in the legislature, though they may feel more influential in multiparty systems than in situations of two-party competition, because of the differences in the nature of party competition and in the intensity of legislative competitiveness. In multiparty systems, it should be more costly and difficult for the parties to be organized together to challenge the president who gains institutional leverage. Therefore, the more parties in the

legislature, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, because the president is likely to face relatively weak competitiveness in a more fragmented legislature. The relationship suggested in the following hypothesis is depicted in Figure 2.1.

***Hypothesis 2*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher in multiparty systems than in two-party competition.


Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Party Systems on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments

2.4.3. Contextual Factor I: Presidential Popularity

The president's legislative contingent and legislative fragmentation may generate institution-level conditions for legislative support (for presidents) and top executive posts (to legislative parties) to be more or less attractive to the chief executive and the parties in the legislature. However, the actual decisions of cabinet appointments are made in the context where the value of legislative support and top executive posts may vary depending on the circumstances

surrounding the chief executive and legislative parties. I examine specifically two contextual factors - presidential popularity and electoral cycle - to argue that there are supply and demand components, shaped by the context-level conditions interacting with institution-level conditions, which contribute to cabinet formation.

In presidential systems where chief executives are directly elected by the public and govern with a national mandate, public support is an enabling factor that creates room for presidents who desire to lead or implement a program to exercise their prerogatives. Often, presidents "go public" as a strategy to enhance their chances of success in the policy-making process and a decent popularity helps in their actual practice of this strategy (Kernell, 2007). Popular presidents, who can directly appeal to voters by going over the heads of legislators, seem to have para-constitutional prerogatives (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 416). Thus, being popular may give more discretion to chief executives in any decision-making process as much of the public and media will be sympathetic to their decisions; on the contrary, legislative actions undermining the authority of chief executives who are strongly backed by national constituents could be costly to their immediate political fate.

Research on cabinet politics in presidential systems suggests that presidential popularity influences the demand of top executive posts (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012). Political parties, generally driven by their electoral prospects, calculate the benefits and costs of forming part of the government. The parties in the legislature can obtain executive offices and policy influence through cabinet membership, but being affiliated with an unpopular president can be risky for the next election. Once in the government, whether they stay or leave is also strongly affected by voters' evaluations of government performance. If presidential approval ratings drop, parties are likely to distance themselves from the president who might

struggle to keep cabinet members in the government. Gaining access to executive resources should be attractive to the parties in the legislature, but how they actually value these resources will vary within the context of the popularity of the chief executive. Therefore, the parties' incentives to be part of the government will be affected by public perceptions of presidential performance.

In sum, presidential popularity is likely to interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of supply and demand incentives shaped jointly by these institutional and contextual factors. When the chief executive is a member of a minority party in the legislature, he has strong incentives to offer cabinet membership to other parties in exchange for their support for the government. Parties in turn will be more motivated to join the government of a publicly popular leader based on their own cost-benefit calculations. In addition, presidents who are losing public confidence may feel more constrained to select partisan ministers in the regional context where public trust in political parties is fairly low (Table 2.2).[13]

Table 2.2: Citizens' Trust in Political Parties as a Political Institution in East Asia

	A Great Deal	Quite a Lot	Not Very Much	None at all
South Korea	4 (0.3%)	146 (12.4%)	613 (51.9%)	418 (35.4%)
Taiwan	24 (1.7%)	200 (13.8%)	892 (61.5%)	334 (23.0%)
Philippines	66 (5.6%)	353 (29.9%)	531 (45.0%)	230 (19.5%)
Indonesia	55 (3.9%)	591 (42.1%)	488 (34.8%)	270 (19.2%)

Notes: The following question is asked to survey respondents in respective countries: "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Trust in Political parties [not any specific party]."
Source: The third wave of the Asian Barometer Surveys,
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/DataRelease3.htm.

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[13] Interview with National Assemblyman, Lee In-je, in Seoul, South Korea, September 12, 2013.

As the presidential party gains seats in the legislature, we should expect a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet appointments, because the presidential incentives to seek legislative support become attenuated. With their institutional leverage gained from copartisan support, popular presidents will have stronger incentives to appoint nonpartisan members than unpopular presidents due to their political leverage gained from public approval. Therefore, the more popular the president, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, because popular presidents are likely to have more discretion in their decision making. The relationship postulated in the following hypothesis is described graphically in Figure 2.2.

Hypothesis 3: As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when presidents are popular than when they are unpopular in the public.


Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Presidential Popularity on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments

2.4.4. Contextual Factor II: Presidential Electoral Cycle

In presidential systems where the next presidential election date is common knowledge from the first day of a national mandate, the incentives of the chief executive and the parties in the legislature will be shaped by the fixed electoral calendar and shifting over the course of the presidential term (Altman, 2000). At the outset of the president's term, the fate tends to be particularly favorable to a newly elected president who enjoys the presidential honeymoon (Shugart & Carey, 1992). But as his fortunes start fading during the midterm and near the end of the term, he is called a lame duck president who is only waiting for his term to finish. Therefore, presidents will have more discretion in their decision making early in their terms, and this is likely to wane toward the end of their terms.

Research on presidential cabinet appointments indicates that the president's fixed term is related to strong demand-side incentives for cabinet posts (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011). The parties in the legislature are more likely to seek political patronage and policy rewards after the inauguration of a newly elected president (Altman, 2000, p. 264). Yet the value of the patronage tends to slip over the course of the president's term (Amorim Neto & Santos, 2001), and the parties that are mainly driven by their electoral prospects will try to distance themselves from the lame duck president. In addition, party members who intend to participate in the next executive election as candidates or campaign members are likely to leave or not join the government as the election approaches (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, p. 6). Thus, the presidential electoral cycle will by and large influence the legislative parties' incentives to be part of the government.

Similarly to the effect of presidential popularity, the presidential electoral cycle is expected to interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of the ways in which supply and demand incentives are shaped together by the institutional and contextual factors.

When the president's party holds only a minority of seats in the legislature, presidential

incentives to seek legislative support are stronger. Given the patronage offer from the chief

executive, the parties in the legislature will be more motivated to support the government at the

outset than the close of the president's term in office.

As the presidential party gains seats in the legislature, there should be a higher incidence

of nonpartisan cabinet appointments, which is related to chief executives' institutional leverage.

Holding growing support from copartisans equal, presidents earlier in their term will have

stronger incentives to appoint nonpartisan members due to their political leverage gained from

the effect of the presidential electoral cycle. Therefore, the earlier the appointment takes place in

the president's term, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in

the president's legislative contingent, because situations tend to be more favorable to the

president at the outset of his term. The relationship proposed in the following hypothesis is

outlined graphically in Figure 2.3.

***Hypothesis 4*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share
of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when the president's term is beginning than
ending.

Figure 2.3: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with the Presidential Electoral Cycle on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments

The preceding hypotheses jointly form a comprehensive model of cabinet formation in Asian presidential systems (Figure 2.4). The president's legislative contingent will produce basic supply-side conditions for a particular cabinet formation process due to presidential incentives involving his policy goals. But the incentives of the parties in the legislature are also important since the actual formation process usually includes them, specifically when the president is a member of a minority party in the legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation will not only generate demand-side conditions with its own effects but also will interact with the president's legislative contingent to shape institution-level incentives of the chief executive and the parties in the legislature. Yet the appointment decisions are not made in a vacuum; and presidential popularity and electoral cycle will produce context-level conditions. The contextual factors themselves may not directly influence cabinet formation, but they will interact with the president's legislative contingent to generate additional conditions for legislative support (for

presidents) and top executive posts (to legislative parties) to be more or less attractive to presidents and the parties in the legislature, respectively. Specifically, when presidents face a more fragmented legislature, when presidents are popular in the public, and when the president's terms are beginning, there will be a higher likelihood of nonpartisan appointments in the cabinet as the president's legislative contingent increases. On the contrary, partisan appointments are more likely to the cabinet under the same institutional (i.e., a more fragmented legislature) and contextual conditions (i.e., popular presidents or the president's terms at the outset) as the president's legislative contingent decreases, because the perceived values of legislative support and top executive posts are relatively high to both presidents and the parties in the legislature, respectively.


Figure 2.4: A Model of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies

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3. Empirical Analysis: The Patterns of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asia

How well does the theory of cabinet formation presented in Chapter 2 account for the actual patterns in cabinet politics in presidential systems? In this chapter, I test the main empirical implications of my theory and provide a comparative look at presidential cabinets across democracies of varying institution-level and context-level conditions in order to assess the effect of these conditions on the practice of cabinet politics. For this purpose, I use cabinet-level time-series cross-section data from twenty-one administrations of four Asian democracies whose presidential systems vary on these sets of institutional and contextual variables of interest. I start the chapter with an introduction of an original data set compiled for the analysis in this dissertation before describing the variables and the empirical models used for the analysis. I present the results of the empirical tests with an interpretation of them, followed by the discussion of the evaluation on the coincidence of pattern between the theory and the empirical results.

3.1. Case Selection and Data

I have chosen as my cases four major democracies in Northeast and Southeast Asia which have a popularly elected president and whose population is over five million: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). I use the Polity score,[1] which lists a political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as "democracy", to determine the respective beginning year of democracy.[2] The choice of cases showing a similar level of democratization is important since these levels tend to be correlated with the degree of

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[1] Source: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
[2] For example, the period of the post-war and pre-authoritarian era in the Philippines (1946-1972) is not counted as a democracy since the scores that the country marked do not meet the minimum threshold value of 6.

institutional development. The selected four cases are all relatively new but stable democracies in the process of consolidating democracy as they have "witnessed at least two complete presidential terms and survived at least ten years as a democracy" (Amorim Neto, 1998, pp. 53-54). In addition, presidents in these Asian democracies have sufficient discretion to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers so that cabinet appointments are perceived to be executive prerogatives (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). Included in the final sample are twenty-one administrations from four presidential systems (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies

South Korea	Taiwan	Philippines	Indonesia
Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)	Lee Teng-hui* (1992-1996)	Corazon Aquino (1986-1992)	Abdurrahman Wahid*† (1999-2001)
Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)	Lee Teng-hui (1996-2000)	Fidel Ramos (1992-1998)	
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	Chen Shui-bian (2000-2004)	Joseph Estrada† (1998-2001)	Megawati Sukarnoputri* (2001-2004)
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)	Chen Shui-bian (2004-2008) *Reelected*	Gloria Arroyo** (2001-2004)	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009)
		Gloria Arroyo (2004-2010)	
Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)	Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2012)	Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016)	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009-2014) *Reelected*
	Ma Ying-jeou (2012-2016) *Reelected*		

*Notes: *indirectly elected; **inherited the presidency as a vice president; †impeached*

There are two things to note about the selected cases. First, in some cases such as Taiwan and Indonesia, the beginning of democracy did not come together with a direct executive election. Instead of being directly elected by the public, Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan (before 1996) and Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia were chosen by an electoral

body made up of elected or a mix of elected and appointed members.[3] Indirectly elected

presidents of Indonesia were accountable to the electoral body, but both Taiwan and Indonesia

granted extensive power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers to these presidents. Second,

Taiwan in the post-1997 period has adopted a semi-presidential constitution, based on which the

cabinet is partially accountable to the legislature that has a vote of no-confidence against the

premier and the executive branch. But the president may dissolve the legislature once such a

vote has been cast. According to the categorization of semi-presidentialism (Shugart, 2005, p.

332), Taiwan is a political system with a constitutionally powerful president (i.e., "president-

parliamentary" subtype) who has broad powers of cabinet selection and de-selection and may

dissolve the legislature once a no-confidence vote has been cast. In other words, presidents of

Taiwan have a powerful institutional weapon to defend against the legislative attempt to dismiss

the entire cabinet.[4] Therefore, the similarity in the operation of the Taiwanese political system to

other presidential democracies makes it comparable to the three other Asian cases.[5]

To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, I compiled an original data set called "East

Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set", which records the cabinet composition of twenty-one

presidential administrations from four Asian democracies: Indonesia (1999-2012), the

Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). The periods that

the data cover vary across cases but span over two decades per case on average. To compile the

cabinet-level data set, I first collected detailed data on cabinet ministers from the four cases. The

individual-level data set called "East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set" includes the biographical,

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[3] Taiwan had a National Assembly - not a legislative body - whose member was elected and which had no legislative power. It convened once every four years to choose a president and a vice president before 1996. Indonesia's electoral body is called the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Consultative Council), a majority of whose members were also members of the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; People's Representative Council). See Hicken and Kasuya (2003, pp. 125-126) for further details.
[4] The president's institutional weapon to defend the executive branch has been powerful enough to prevent legislators in Taiwan from attempting to dissolve the cabinet at the cost of their jobs.
[5] Personal Conversation with Dr. Yu-Shan Wu at Academia Sinica, October 21, 2013.

educational, occupational, and political backgrounds of each individual minister. The sources for the list and profile of cabinet ministers are described in detail in the appendix (Table A1). I use a country-month as a unit of analysis and analyze the monthly variation in composition of presidential cabinets from the four cases.

There are two reasons that a country-month is a preferable unit of analysis for this dissertation. First, as examined in Chapter 1, the cabinet formation patterns in Asian presidential systems are distinct from the ones in Latin American presidential systems. In contrast with presidential systems in Latin America where scholars have explained the variation in cabinet composition based on changes in the partisan configuration of the cabinet throughout the presidential terms (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 74-75), the variation in composition of Asian presidential cabinets is largely based on the frequent replacement of individual ministers with little change in the partisan configuration of the cabinet throughout the terms.[6] To capture these unique patterns in Asia, therefore, I use a country-month as a unit of analysis, instead of a cabinet or a country-year that was used in the literature (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2002, 2006; Cheibub, 2007). Structuring the data in this way will help to analyze the prevalent patterns of cabinet formation within one presidential system or administration, or from one to the next. Second, it is an appropriate unit of analysis for time-series cross-section analysis and has been recently used in the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems, particularly on cabinet termination (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012; Kellam, 2013).

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[6] To my knowledge, there are only three cases of party membership changes in the cabinet throughout the presidential term in Asia. One in South Korea in 2001 and the other two in the Philippines in 2000 and 2005.

3.2. Measurement

In this section, I introduce a dependant variable and a set of independent variables that are used in the analysis. Before describing these variables, I first address some important questions of the common standards across countries with regards to the categorization of cabinet ministers into different types (*what qualifies as a nonpartisan member?*) and the scope of the cabinet (*what is a list of specific ministers that are included in the cabinet?*).

3.2.1. Categorizing a Type: Partisan versus Nonpartisan Ministers

Following the definition from the literature (e.g., Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Almeida & Cho, 2007), I list a cabinet minister as a nonpartisan member when she is not affiliated with any political party at the time of the appointment.[7] Typically, included in this category are professors, civil servants, businessmen, lawyers, and other experts whose appointments have nothing to do with political commitment or partisan purposes. In contrast, legislative members are most commonly partisans across cases, but non-politicians who represent a political party under the party banner are also coded as partisans. Nonpartisans and partisans are mutually exclusive categories. In general, nonpartisans are expected to play a different role as they are "not members of the structures of power within the party, cannot participate in party decisions, and cannot bring together other party members to defend their policies" (Teruel, 2012, p. 5). Moreover, the chief executive's incentives to appoint nonpartisans versus partisan members are dichotomous as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, an official status of party affiliation at the time of the appointment will be a clear-cut criterion for categorizing the partisan/nonpartisan type of cabinet ministers.

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[7] For simplicity and gender balance, I will refer to all presidents in the masculine (he) and all ministers in the feminine (she).

In the four cases of Asian presidential systems, a majority of nonpartisan ministers have backgrounds in academia, civil service, or business (Table 3.2). Yet some of them seem connected with a political party, particularly after their appointment. For example, the current Minister of Transportation and Communications of Taiwan, Yeh Kuang-shih, was a professor of business administration at the time of his appointment to the Ma Ying-jeou government. Yeh joined the presidential party *Kuomintang* (KMT) after his appointment and became an appointed member of the central committee of the party (指定中常委). Although Yeh earned party membership, he is coded as a nonpartisan minister because his appointment was based on his academic background rather than his connection with the KMT.[8] In addition, some nonpartisans become partisan members in the middle of their career paths in the government. For instance, Jiang Yi-hua, who is the current Premier of Taiwan, was a professor of political science when he first joined the Ma Ying-jeou government as the Minister of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission in 2008. Then he was appointed as the Minister of Interior but still remained unaffiliated with the KMT. Later, he joined the KMT while he was serving as the Vice Premier of Taiwan in 2012. Minister and Vice Premier Jiang are listed as nonpartisans, but Premier Jiang is coded as a partisan member due to his party membership at the time of the appointment as Premier.

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[8] Interview with the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Yeh Kuang-shih, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 9, 2013.

Table 3.2: Share of Subtypes of Nonpartisan Ministers in Four Asian Presidential Systems

Country	Civil Service	Academia	Business	Law	Journalism	Military/ Police	Others
South Korea	0.522	0.275	0.059	0.023	0.040	0.083	0.033
Taiwan	0.349	0.481	0.028	0.042	0.008	0.076	0.015
Philippines	0.144	0.332	0.257	0.118	0.000	0.092	0.058
Indonesia	0.198	0.372	0.122	0.033	0.022	0.162	0.091

Notes: Proportions represent the shares of subtypes among nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets. A unit of analysis is a country-month.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.2.2. Setting the Scope of Cabinet

To make cases comparable to one another, it is important to set the scope of the cabinet based on a common standard. The reason behind this is because of the instrumental view of the cabinet as a team of the presidential equipment to promote the effective exercise of his authority and to help implement his ultimate responsibilities (Fenno, 1959, p. 5). Once in office, every president has his own governing agenda and will organize his team accordingly.[9] Some presidents might reform the structure of the executive branch as a whole by creating a new agency, splitting or merging old agencies, or promoting or demoting an existing agency.

To determine a list of departments or ministries to be included in the analysis, I use official government web sources and the organization chart described on the web pages. Included are all the departments or ministries in the executive branch whose heads are appointed and dismissed on the sole basis of presidential authority. For this reason, the executive agencies whose heads are formally independent from the government, such as the Central Bank, are

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[9] Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013. Interview with the former Minster of Employment and Labor, the former Presidential Chief of Staff, and the former assemblyman, Yim Tae-hee, in Seoul, South Korea, August 21, 2013.

excluded from the sample.[10] Formal independence may not be equivalent to political

independence in every place, but the dynamic of appointing the head of the independent agency

should be different from that of appointing other ministers (Martinez-Gallardo, 2005, p. 141).

The existing literature also excludes heads of independent agencies from the sample. (e.g.,

Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012). The full list of the titles of cabinet members included in the

analysis is in the appendix (Table A2).

3.2.3. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the analysis is the share of nonpartisan ministers in the

presidential cabinet. It is calculated based on the number of cabinet positions allocated to

nonpartisan members divided by the total number of cabinet posts.[11]   Figure 3.1 presents

data on the share of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets from twenty-one

administrations of four countries. The proportion is based on the monthly observation of cabinet

composition within presidential administrations in the respective country cases since the unit of

analysis is a country-month. The proportion varies within administrations and countries as well

as across them. In South Korea and the Philippines, the within-administration variation in the

share of nonpartisan ministers seems wider than in Taiwan and Indonesia. For example, in South

Korea, the lowest share is 0.28, recorded in the Kim Dae-jung administration, where the highest

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[10] In Taiwan, the National Communications Commission, the Fair Trade Commission, and the Central Election Commission are excluded from the sample for the same reason.

[11] In terms of potential variation in the relative value of cabinet portfolios, every cabinet post might not carry equivalent importance and some positions that require more professionalism, such as Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice Ministers, may be more likely to be assigned to qualified nonpartisan members. Moreover, the relative value can vary across cabinets, administrations, and political systems over time. Scholars have used weighted measures based on an expert survey method to give different scores across cabinet portfolios (e.g., Kato & Laver, 1998; Druckman & Warwick, 2005; Druckman & Roberts, 2008). An expert survey of these four Asian countries, if it provides scores of the relative importance of all ministerial portfolios in these countries, would be a unique contribution to the study of presidential democracies in Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, the nature of time-series cross-section analysis for this dissertation introduces a main challenge to conducting this survey, because the scores only reflect the experts' assessment on the value of existing portfolios at the time of survey. Thus, I will leave this for a future research agenda.

share is 0.89. Similarly, the first Arroyo administration records a huge difference between its lowest and highest shares throughout its term - 0.32 and 0.78. In contrast, the largest difference recorded in Taiwan is during the second Lee Teng-hui administration, where 0.57 was the lowest and 0.81 was the highest. Similarly, in Indonesia, the within-administration variation is relatively narrow with the widest spread being recorded during the Wahid administration where the lowest and the highest shares are 0.29 and 0.48, respectively.


Figure 3.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers in Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies

Notes: Ma in Taiwan, Aquino III in the Philippines, and SBY in Indonesia are incumbent presidents still in office as of the end of 2012. A unit of analysis is a country-month.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.2.4. Independent Variables and Operational Criteria

The series of hypotheses described in Chapter 2 is derived from the theory that presidential cabinet formation is mainly explained by the incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature that are significantly shaped by institutional and contextual factors. These incentives should be based on the perceived trading values of legislative support (for the president) and top executive posts (to the parties in the legislature) that may vary depending on the conditions generated by the institutional and contextual factors.

There are two institutional variables and two contextual variables among four independent variables. The first institutional variable is called *Presidential Power* and measures the president's legislative contingent, which is calculated based on the number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature taken by the presidential party divided by the total number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature. Other than the Philippines, which adopted a bicameral system, three of the four Asian cases have a unicameral legislature. In some of these countries, switching, merging, and splitting parties are more common and frequent than in others. In the Philippines, legislative members tend to switch to the presidential party, particularly at the outset of the president's terms. South Korea used to experience legislators' jumping on the presidential (party) bandwagon in the early years following democratization in the late 1980's and 1990's. Taiwan saw the presidential party split due to intraparty factionalism in the late 1990's. To track these changes on a monthly basis, I mainly use official government web sources and procedural reports written in the plenary sessions of the legislature that are updated on the web pages.

The second institutional variable is *Party Competition*, measuring legislative fragmentation, which is computed based on the following formula: $\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} p_i^2}$ where *n* is the number

of parties holding at least one seat in the lower chamber of the legislature and p_i is the seat share

of the ith party in the lower chamber of the legislature. The formula takes into account the

degree of fragmentation as well as the number of parties in the legislature because it weighs the

number of parties by their share in the legislature (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). Note that I list

the nth party as the presidential party and do not include its share in the computation for two

reasons. First, since *Party Competition* is a conceptual measure of the nature of party systems -

the nature of party competition and the intensity of legislative competitiveness against the

president, the adopted formula will actually represent the own effects of legislative

fragmentation without counting the president's legislative contingent. Second, legislative

fragmentation tends to be strongly correlated with the president's legislative contingent (Amorim

Neto, 2006, p. 422). Thus, the adopted formula may solve the potential multicollinearity problem

that could be caused by using the original formula. Similarly with *Presidential Power*, the

calculation is based on the number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature. I follow

Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, p. 173) to treat the cases of independent legislative members and

minor parties grouped jointly as others. Official government web sites and procedural reports

written in the plenary sessions of the legislature are the main sources for tracking any possible

changes in the seat share of the parties in the legislature between legislative elections.

The third independent variable and the first contextual variable is *Presidential Popularity*,

which measures the president's popularity among the general public. I use presidential approval

ratings that are based on the results of national public opinion surveys conducted in each of the

four countries. Presidential approval ratings, which range from 0 to 1, are the proportions of

survey responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" combined in answer to the

question of "How satisfied or dissatisfied you are in the performance of (name) as President of

(country)?". The data on presidential approval ratings come from survey organizations with a nationwide reputation and scholarly acknowledgement for reliability.

The fourth independent variable and the second contextual variable is *Electoral Cycle*, measuring the number of days left until the end of the president's term that is mandated by the constitution.

3.2.5. Control Variables

Four variables are included in the analysis as control variables. The first control variable is *Economic Shock*, measuring the economic context where unfavorable situations happen unexpectedly due to economic events. I use the monthly change in the consumer price index, which has been also used to control the impact of economic shocks in the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2012).   The second control variable is *Age of Democracy* and measures the age of democracy in years. The possible impact of this measure on cabinet formation is that "the share of non-partisans in the cabinet may depend on the level of consolidation of the democratic regime" so that "a transitional polity with an unconsolidated party system may be more conducive to non-partisanship in the cabinet" (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 639).

The third control variable is *Constitutional Powers*, which measures the formal powers of the president. This variable has been a main independent variable in the literature on presidential cabinet formation. I use ordinal scales from the classification by Shugart and Carey (1992), which is slightly re-interpreted based on the world constitutions and other academic sources. The classification by Shugart and Carey divides the formal powers into two categories - legislative and non-legislative powers - which have multiple types of powers within each category. The

overall measure is the sum of the individual scores (ranging from 0 to 4) of each subtype of

powers within the two categories. In my sample, the overall measure records the lowest from 9

(Indonesia) to 21.5 (South Korea) as the highest (See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).

The last control variable is *Copartisan Share*, measuring the share of copartisan ministers

in the cabinet. It is included to control for the effect of any incentive for the president to appoint

copartisans, because my theory mainly explains presidential incentives to appoint nonpartisan

ministers versus partisan ministers from the parties other than the president's in the legislature.

For the variables *Presidential Popularity* and *Economic Shock*, I assign the values for the

moving average of three months prior to the month in which the cabinet was formed (e.g.,

Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). Sometimes, the presidential popularity drops and the inflation rate

surges, but the transmission of their effects on the decision making process has a lag rather than

an immediate impact as they are unexpected events (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 637;

Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 77-78). The sources of all independent and control variables

described in this section are listed in detail in the appendix (Table A3). Table 3.3 provides

summary statistics for the independent and control variables employed in the analysis.

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Independent Variable					
Presidential Power	**1004**	**0.44**	**0.18**	**0.10**	**0.75**
South Korea	300	0.50	0.12	0.15	0.73
Taiwan	240	0.50	0.12	0.24	0.63
Philippines	306	0.46	0.20	0.19	0.75
Indonesia	158	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.31
Party Competition	**1004**	**17.05**	**21.37**	**2.49**	**97.56**
South Korea	300	10.74	6.75	2.8	25.69
Taiwan	240	8.99	3.53	2.49	15.5
Philippines	306	33.83	32.19	9.42	97.56

Indonesia	158	8.76	1.99	5.01	10.95
Presidential Popularity	**879**	**0.49**	**0.19**	**0.06**	**0.87**
South Korea	240	0.46	0.18	0.07	0.84
Taiwan	233	0.45	0.22	0.12	0.81
Philippines	308	0.52	0.16	0.19	0.78
Indonesia	98	0.62	0.08	0.47	0.83
Electoral Cycle	**1019**	**961**	**559**	**20**	**2250**
South Korea	300	921	524	25	1792
Taiwan	240	725	416	20	1430
Philippines	321	1164	633	30	2250
Indonesia	158	984	503	20	1790
Control Variable					
Economic Shock	**1019**	**4.84**	**3.79**	**-2.35**	**20.18**
South Korea	300	4.39	2.23	0.17	11.17
Taiwan	240	1.50	1.51	-2.35	5.21
Philippines	321	6.42	4.09	-1.60	20.18
Indonesia	158	7.59	3.98	-1.10	18.38
Age of Democracy	**1019**	**12.06**	**7.01**	**1**	**27**
South Korea	300	13	7	1	26
Taiwan	240	11	6	1	21
Philippines	321	14	8	1	27
Indonesia	158	8	4	1	14
Constitutional Powers	**1019**	**17.37**	**4.22**	**9**	**21.5**
South Korea	300	21.5	0	21.5	21.5
Taiwan	240	15.6	1.04	15	17.5
Philippines	321	19	0	19	19
Indonesia	158	9	0	9	9
Copartisan Share	**1019**	**0.24**	**0.1**	**0**	**0.52**
South Korea	300	0.27	0.11	0.05	0.52
Taiwan	240	0.28	0.06	0.18	0.40
Philippines	321	0.23	0.11	0.00	0.50
Indonesia	158	0.14	0.04	0.09	0.20

Note: A unit of analysis is a country-month.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.3. Method: Modeling Presidential Cabinet Formation

To test the series of hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 by modeling the conditions under

which political interaction between presidents and the parties in the legislature leads to cabinet

formation, I use an extended beta-binomial model. The extended beta-binomial model has been

widely used in the literature on cabinet formation in presidential and semi-presidential systems

for two reasons (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-

Jones, 2009b, 2010). First, with choice of the share of partisan or nonpartisan ministers as a

dependent variable, its distribution ranges from 0 to 1, like the range of my dependent variable.

Second, the share of nonpartisan members in the cabinet is based on collective binary outcomes

(i.e., the appointment of either partisan or nonpartisan ministers) that are likely to influence each

other rather than be totally independent of each other, because the appointment decisions take

into account the overall cabinet formation. When the probability π of binomial choice is not

identical,[12] which is likely in reality, the extended binomial model handles the degree to which π

varies by introducing the other parameter, γ (King, 1998, p. 47). When binary outcomes are

positively correlated ($\gamma > 0$) or negatively correlated ($\gamma < 0$) so that there is any dependence of

each other, the extended beta-binomial model can cover it and make up each observation (King,

1998, p. 48). Given the structure of time-series cross-sectional data, I also use a panel fixed

effects model as an additional estimation to check the robustness of the estimation of the

extended beta-binomial model.[13] Country fixed effects are used for both models with South

Korea as a baseline category to cover any unobserved country-specific sources of variation.

3.4. Empirical Results

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[12] When binary outcomes are mutually independent and the probability π of binomial choice is identical, the beta binomial model can be used (King, 1998).

[13] To address potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in error terms in the panel data, I use a cluster-robust standard error option for both models.

Before discussing specific results, I first reiterate the four hypotheses proposed in

Chapter 2 and follow with a summary of the expected signs of estimated coefficients of variables

in the analysis (Table 3.4).

***Hypothesis 1*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, there is a higher incidence of
nonpartisan cabinet members in presidential cabinets.

***Hypothesis 2*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share
of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher in multiparty systems than in two-party
competition.

***Hypothesis 3*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share
of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when presidents are popular than unpopular in
the public.

***Hypothesis 4*:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share
of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when the president's term is beginning than
ending.

Table 3.4: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Variable Description	Expected Sign
1	*Presidential Power*	President's Legislative Contingent	+
2	*Party Competition*	Legislative Fragmentation	--
	Presidential Power		+
	Presidential Power x Party Competition		+
3	*Presidential Popularity*	Presidential Approval Ratings	--
	Presidential Power		+
	Presidential Power x Presidential Popularity		+
4	*Electoral Cycle*	Days Left until Presidential Term End	--
	Presidential Power		+
	Presidential Power x Electoral Cycle		+

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate estimated coefficients of variables on the institution-level and context-level conditions. The results lend relatively strong support to my argument even after controlling for presidential constitutional powers, the copartisan ministers' share, economic contexts, and the age of democracy. Specific results are discussed below.

Table 3.5: Extended Beta-Binomial Models for the Share of Nonpartisan Ministers in Twenty-one Administrations from Four Asian Presidential Systems

	Dependent Variable: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers			
	Extended Beta-Binomial			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Presidential Power	1.149	1.274	-0.887	1.431
	(0.411)***	(0.551)**	(0.68)	(0.551)***
Party Competition		0.045		
		(0.023)*		
Presidential Power **x** *Party Competition*		-0.055		
		(0.03)*		
Presidential Popularity			-2.177	
			(0.672)***	
Presidential Power **x** *Presidential Popularity*			4.639	
			(1.273)***	
Electoral Cycle				0.0001
				(0.0002)
Presidential Power **x** *Electoral Cycle*				-0.0002
				(0.0003)
Economic Shock	0.007	0.001	0.006	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.01)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Age of Democracy	0.008	0.006	0.018	0.009
	(0.005)*	(0.005)	(0.007)**	(0.005)*
Constitutional Powers	0.024	0.042	0.016	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.03)
Copartisan Share	-4.737	-5.12	-5.213	-4.718
	(0.357)***	(0.375)***	(0.336)***	(0.363)***
Constant	0.925	0.484	2.007	0.847
	(0.623)	(0.823)	(0.782)**	(0.61)
Taiwan	0.055	0.152	0.019	0.035

	(0.206)	(0.267)	(0.229)	(0.191)
Philippines	-0.08	-0.271	-0.149	-0.097
	(0.141)	(0.154)*	(0.19)	(0.148)
Indonesia	-1.154	-1.082	-1.087	-1.185
	(0.36)***	(0.461)**	(0.604)*	(0.345)***
Number of Observations	1004	1004	865	1004

Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by countries) in parentheses. The omitted category in all models is South Korea.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 3.6: Panel Fixed Effects Models for the Share of Nonpartisan Ministers in Twenty-one Administrations from Four Asian Presidential Systems

	Dependent Variable: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers			
	Panel Fixed Effects			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Presidential Power	0.261	0.269	-0.138	0.323
	(0.069)**	(0.089)*	(0.117)	(0.074)**
Party Competition		0.009		
		(0.003)*		
***Presidential Power* x**		-0.010		
Party Competition		(0.004)*		
Presidential Popularity			-0.428	
			(0.199)	
***Presidential Power* x**			0.901	
Presidential Popularity			(0.294)**	
Electoral Cycle				0.00003
				(0.00002)
***Presidential Power* x**				-0.00005
Electoral Cycle				(0.00004)
Economic Shock	0.002	0.0004	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Age of Democracy	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)*	(0.001)
Constitutional Powers	0.003	0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Copartisan Share	-0.966	-1.034	-1.045	-0.963
	(0.080)***	(0.099)***	(0.083)***	(0.080)***
Constant	0.669	0.556	0.882	0.645
	(0.089)***	(0.173)**	(0.113)***	(0.104)***
Number of Observations	1004	1004	865	1004

The findings suggest that Hypotheses 1 and 3 are strongly supported by the results while Hypotheses 2 and 4 are only partially supported. First, the president's legislative contingent (*Presidential Power*) has a strong positive effect on the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. In Model 1, the coefficient of *Presidential Power* indicates that a 10 percentage-point increase in the president's legislative contingent leads to about a 2.6 percentage-point increase in the nonpartisan share. The positive correlation remains statistically significant throughout the empirical tests of diverse models except in Model 3. Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of the president's legislative contingent and the predicted share of nonpartisan cabinet members.


Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of President's Legislative Contingent and Predicted Share of Nonpartisan Cabinet Members

Note: Predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

Second, the results in Model 2 are about the effect of the institution-level conditions on the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. The interpretation of the two coefficients related to the institution-level conditions (*Presidential Power* and *Party Competition*) needs caution as they interact with each other. The results in Model 2 predict that the effect of legislative fragmentation on the nonpartisan share of cabinet posts should vary depending on the president's legislative contingent as the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant. My expectation is that the coefficient of *Party Competition* will be negative while the coefficient of the interaction term is positive. However, the results show that actual signs of both coefficients are opposite to my prediction, indicating that the effect of the president's legislative contingent seems mediated rather than strengthened by legislative fragmentation. Although the results do not exactly match my prediction, the nonpartisan-held share of ministerial positions in presidential cabinets is still higher in the presence of multiparty competition (than in two-party competition) throughout the varying extents of the president's legislative contingent (Figure 3.3). The estimated coefficient of *Presidential Power* is reported to be positive (and statistically significant) as expected. Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effect of legislative fragmentation on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members across the range of the president's legislative contingent.

Figure 3.3: Marginal Effect of Legislative Fragmentation on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent

Note: Predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

Third, in Model 3, I measure the effect of presidential popularity on the share of

nonpartisan cabinet members with varying extents of the president's legislative contingent. The

interpretation of the two coefficients (*Presidential Power* and *Presidential Popularity*) is not

simple due to their interaction. The results in Model 3 predict that the effect of presidential

popularity on the share of cabinet positions assigned to nonpartisans should vary depending on

the president's legislative contingent since the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically

significant. My theory suggests that 1) the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive

because the effect of one factor is reinforced by the presence of the other; and 2) the coefficient

of *Presidential Popularity* should be negative because the parties in the legislature are more

likely to join or stay in the government led by popular rather than unpopular presidents. The

results indicate that both coefficients show the same signs as predicted. Interestingly, the

estimated coefficient on *Presidential Power* is found not statistically significant, implying that

the effect of the president's legislative contingent is substantively attenuated by the presence of

unpopular presidents. For instance, the difference between the share of nonpartisan cabinet

members is about three times larger among popular presidents than among unpopular ones when

the president's legislative contingent is at its maximum compared to its minimum. In Figure 3.4,

I illustrate graphically the marginal effect of presidential popularity on the share of nonpartisan

cabinet members across the range of the president's legislative contingent.

Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of Presidential Popularity on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent

Note: Predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

Fourth, in Model 4, I measure the effect of the presidential electoral cycle on the share of

nonpartisan cabinet members with varying extents of the president's legislative contingent.

Similarly, the interpretation of the two coefficients (*Presidential Power* and *Electoral Cycle*) is not straightforward due to their interaction. The results in Model 4 predict that since the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant, there is no differential effect of the presidential electoral cycle on the nonpartisan share depending on the president's legislative contingent. The only statistically significant variable is *Presidential Power* whose sign is positive as expected, indicating that there is a positive effect of the president's legislative contingent on the appointment of nonpartisans to the cabinet, even for a lame duck president.

Lastly, the estimated coefficients of country dummy variables in Table 3.5 imply that Indonesian cabinets have significantly different composition when compared with cabinets in the three other Asian countries. All else equal, presidents of Indonesia are less likely by 27.6 percentage points to appoint nonpartisan cabinet members than presidents of South Korea.

3.5. Discussion

According to the theory of cabinet formation presented in Chapter 2, the president's legislative contingent is a main source of institutional leverage for presidents vis-à-vis the legislature, and presidential cabinets, when in the presence of more copartisan support in the legislature, should feature higher rates of nonpartisan members. My theory further predicts that the president's legislative contingent will interact with another institutional variable such as legislative fragmentation as well as with contextual variables such as presidential popularity and electoral cycle since these variables may grant additional leverage to presidents in the cabinet formation process. Specifically, presidents who face more fragmentation in the legislature, have higher approval ratings, and are at an earlier point in their term will be more likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers as the president's legislative contingent increases. The time-series cross-

section analysis of my original dataset provides strong evidence to support my hypotheses, particularly on the effects of the president's legislative contingent and its interaction with presidential popularity.

First, the positive impact of the president's legislative contingent on the incidence of nonpartisan appointments is consistent and significant throughout diverse empirical tests, suggesting that it plays a critical role as a key institutional condition in the cabinet formation process. Second, presidential popularity has a powerful impact on cabinet appointment decisions as well as on the president's legislative contingent. Presidential cabinets composed by popular presidents feature higher rates of partisan members than cabinets composed by unpopular presidents when in the presence of minority presidents. They also feature higher rates of nonpartisan members when in the presence of plurality/majority presidents. This finding is in line with findings in the literature that popular presidents are less likely to see defections from their cabinets than less popular ones, because parties have stronger incentives to stay in the government led by popular presidents (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, p. 80). In contrast, unpopular presidents are not granted much leverage from an increasing share of copartisans in the legislature as the effect of the president's legislative contingent is considerably mitigated by their low public support.

Third, legislative fragmentation also has a statistically significant impact on the cabinet appointment decisions as well as the president's legislative contingent, but its positive effect is attenuated rather than reinforced by interaction with the latter. Yet the nonpartisan share in presidential cabinets is consistently higher in multiparty competition than in two-party competition throughout the varying extents of the president's legislative contingent. In sum, facing a less competitive legislature provides some leverage to presidents in the cabinet

formation process, but its impact seems somewhat reduced toward the positive end across the range of president's legislative contingent. Lastly, the effect of the president's legislative contingent on the incidence of nonpartisan appointments is positive and statistically significant even for a lame duck president whose term is ending. However, the effect in Asian democracies of the presidential electoral cycle on parties' incentives to demand cabinet posts is not as clear as in the literature (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011).

Appendix

Table A1: Sources for the List and Profile of Cabinet Ministers in the East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set

Country	Source
Worldwide	CIA Directory of *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*; LexisNexis Academic; Keesing's Record of World Events; Political Handbook of the World
South Korea	The Korean Ministerial Database from Hahm, Jung, and Lee (2013); Government and Ministry Web Pages; Yonhap News; Joongang Daily (people.joins.com); Chosun Daily (people.chosun.com); Naver Profile
Taiwan	Executive Yuan and Ministry Web Pages; Kuomintang (KMT) Homepage; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Homepage; China Times; Liberty Times; UDN; TVBS
Philippines	Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines; Presidential Office, Government, and Department Web Pages; Business Daily; Business Star; Business World; Malaya; Manila Bulletin; Manila Chronicle; Manila Standard; Manila Times; Philippine Daily Inquirer; Philippine Star; Philippine Journal; Philippine Times Journal; Today; Sunstar; Philstar; The Manila Times; ABS-CBN News; GMA News Online; Bloomberg Businessweek; The Information Site on Philippine Politics and Government at Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)
Indonesia	Suryadinanta (2002); Jakarta Post; Jakarta Globe; Kompas.com; Merdeka.com; Tokohindonesia.com; The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Web Site; Government and Ministry Web Pages

Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis

Country	Name
South Korea (17)	Prime Minister Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism Minister of Education, Science, and Technology

	Minister of Environment Minister of Finance Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister of Gender Equality and Family Minister of Health and Welfare Minister of Justice Minister of Employment and Labor Minister of Knowledge Economy Minister of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs Minister of National Defense Minister of Public Administration and Security Minister of Special Affairs Minister of Unification
Taiwan (34)	Premier Vice Premier Secretary General of the Executive Yuan Minister of Economic Affairs Minister of Education Minister of Finance Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Health Minister of Interior Minister of Justice Minister of National Defense Minister of Transportation and Communications Minister of the Agricultural Council Minister of the Atomic Energy Council Minister of the Central Personnel Administration Minister of the Coast Guard Administration Minister of the Council for Cultural Affairs Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development Minister of the Council for Hakka Affairs Minister of the Council of Indigenous Peoples Minister of the Council of Labor Affairs Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics Minister of the Environmental Protection Administration Minister of the Financial Supervisory Commission Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council Minister of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission Director of the National Palace Museum Minister of the National Science Council Minister of the National Youth Commission Minister of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Minister of the Public Construction Commission Minister of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission Minister of the Sports Affairs Council Minister of the Veterans Affairs Commission
Philippines (23)	Vice President Executive Secretary Secretary of Agrarian Reform Secretary of Agriculture

	Secretary of the Budget and Management Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports Secretary of Energy Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary of Finance Secretary of Foreign Affairs Secretary of Health Secretary of Interior and Local Govt. Secretary of Justice Secretary of Labor and Employment Secretary of National Defense Secretary of Public Works and Highways Secretary of Science and Technology Secretary of Social Welfare and Development Secretary of Socioeconomic Planning (NEDA) Secretary of Tourism Secretary of Trade and Industry Secretary of Transportation and Communications Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
Indonesia (35)	Vice President Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs Coordinating Minister of the People's Welfare Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs State Secretary Minister of Agriculture Minister of Communication and Information Minister of Culture and Tourism Minister of Defense Minister of National Education Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Minister of Finance Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Forestry Minister of Health Minister of Home Affairs Minister of Industry Minister of Justice and Human Rights Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister of Public Works Minister of Religious Affairs Minister of Social Services Minister of Trade Minister of Transportation State Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises State Minister of the Development of Disadvantaged Regions State Minister of the Environment State Minister of National Development Planning State Minister of Public Housing State Minister of Research and Technology State Minister of State-Owned Enterprises

| | State Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform
State Minister of Women's Empowerment
State Minister of Youth and Sports |

Note: The list is based on the government organization formed at the outset of the presidential term in the most recent administrations from respective countries.

Table A3: Sources of Independent and Control Variables in the East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set

Variable	Source
Presidential Power	Adam Carr's Election Archive: Psephos; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001); local newspapers (see Table A1) **South Korea** - National Assembly Web Site **Taiwan** - Legislative Yuan Web Site; Wu (2005) **Philippines** - Teehankee (2002, 2013); Kasuya (2008); The Commission on Elections Web Site; House of Representatives Web Site **Indonesia** - Suryadinanta (2002); Horowitz (2013); DPR Web Site
Party Competition	Adam Carr's Election Archive: Psephos; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001) ; local newspapers (see Table A1) **South Korea** - National Assembly Web Site **Taiwan** - Legislative Yuan Web Site; Wu (2005) **Philippines** - Teehankee (2002, 2013); Kasuya (2008); The Commission on Elections Web Site; House of Representatives Web Site **Indonesia** - Suryadinanta (2002); Horowitz (2013); DPR Web Site
Presidential Popularity	**South Korea** - Research & Research **Taiwan** - Chou (1999); Lin (2013) **Philippines** - Social Weather Station **Indonesia** - Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting (SMRC)
Electoral Cycle	Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001); Adam Carr's Election Archive: Psephos; Wikipedia
Economic Shock	CEIC Database
Age of Democracy	Polity IV Data Set
Constitutional Powers	Shugart and Carey (1992); Hicken and Kasuya (2003); Kasuya (2013a); HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated
Copartisan Share	East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set

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